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JUDGE FRIENDLY'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO SECURITIES
LAW AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: "MODERATION IS
ALL"
FRANK

I. GOODMANt

At the close of his Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures in 1958,
Judge Learned Hand, nearing the end of his career, paid tribute to his
mentors at the Harvard Law School: "In the universe of truth they
lived by the sword; they asked no quarter of absolutes and they gave
none." 1 The great judge might as well have been speaking of himself.
He might have been speaking also of the man, great-judge-to-be, who
was soon to join him on the bench of the Second Circuit and who
would eventually succeed him as the Sage of Foley Square. For no
judge of our time has waged a more unrelenting war against what he
once called "the reign of King Absolute" than Henry Friendly.'
The bracketing of the two names, Hand and Friendly, is inevitable. Despite great differences in age, background, and personality, the
two had much in common. Both were masters of the language:' no
judge has ever surpassed, and few have equalled, Hand as a writer of
expository prose, but Friendly probably comes as close as anyone now
on the bench. Both lifted judicial craftsmanship to the level of high art.
Both were great "balancers" and great formulators of balancing tests.
Both possessed an astonishing versatility, an at-homeness in a wide
range of subjects and levels of complexity. Both were keenly aware of
the limitations of the judicial office and the deference due other decisionmaking institutions. Both, moreover, as members of an "inferior"
federal tribunal, labored under a similar set of constraints. Bound,
often tightly, by the decisions of the Supreme Court, hemmed in by the
proliferating precedents of their own circuit, rarely exposed to the great
constitutional issues of the day, lacking discretionary control over their
dockets and therefore condemned to a diet of routine cases presenting
narrowly technical or factual issues, both Hand and Friendly had far
less room to stretch their wings than high court justices in Washington
t Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. A.B. 1954, Harvard University;
B.A. 1956, Oxford University; LL.B. 1959, Harvard University.
'

L.

HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS

77 (1964).

s H. FRIENDLY, A Postscript on Miranda, in BENCHMARKS 277 (1967). Where
Judge Friendly is concerned, I cannot pretend to objectivity. My wife, Joan Friendly
Goodman, is the Judge's daughter, and no one as near and dear to her as he could help
but be a favorite of mine.
' I speak of both men in the past tense to avoid stylistic atrocity. At a vigorous 82,
Judge Friendly has lost none of his powers.
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or in many of the states. That they so often soared is all the more
remarkable. Friendly, it might be added, was further handicapped by
having to write on a slate already crowded with the indelible inscriptions of Hand himself and his formidable colleagues Augustus Hand,
Thomas Swan, Jerome Frank, and Charles Clark.
I shall not press the comparison further, though it might be revealing to do so. Instead, I propose to discuss certain aspects of Judge
Friendly's work in two areas-securities law and criminal procedure-in the hope of conveying some of his distinctive qualities as a
judge and legal scholar.
I.

JUDGE FRIENDLY AND SECURITIES LAW

In terms of judicial output alone, perhaps the most sustained demonstration of Judge Friendly's essential qualities is to be found in his
opinions interpreting the federal securities statutes. The Second Circuit,
of course, has played a major role in the development of this body of
law, and Friendly has probably written more opinions (over 100) than
any other federal appellate judge. Those noted below are only a small
fraction of the total, and they do not include the one he himself considers the best.4
From the beginning, Judge Friendly left no doubt as to how he
felt about this class of white collar crimes. He introduced one of his
early securities cases by describing it as "another of those sickening
financial frauds which so sadly memorialize the rapacity of the perpetrators and the gullibility, and perhaps also the cupidity, of the victims."' 5 (How like him not to ignore the victim's moral warts!) The

convicted coconspirators, an accountant and a lawyer, pleaded ignorance. Friendly, unimpressed, replied:
In our complex society the accountant's certificate and the
lawyer's opinion can be instruments for inflicting pecuniary
loss more potent than the chisel or the crowbar. . . . Congress . . . could not have intended that men holding them-

selves out as members of these ancient professions should be
able to escape criminal liability on a plea of ignorance when
they have shut their eyes to what was plainly to be seen or
have represented a knowledge they knew they did not
6
possess.
" Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1.973).
" United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 856 (2d Cir. 1964).
6 Id. at 863.
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Rosenfeld v. Black" evoked a more controversial application of fiduciary ethics to the behavior of the street. The shareholders of a mutual fund sought an accounting by its retiring investment advisor, Lazard Freres, for payments Lazard had received from its successor in
compensation for arranging the substitution. Undaunted by the fact
that the "succession fee" was standard practice in the industry and the
means by which investment advisors often cashed in their chips, Judge
Friendly, writing for the panel, held the plaintiffs entitled to their accounting under the well-established equitable principle, impliedly incorporated by Congress in the Investment Company Act, that a fiduciary may not sell or transfer her office for personal gain.
A fiduciary endeavoring to influence the selection of a successor must do so with an eye single to the best interests of
beneficiaries. Experience has taught them that no matter
how high-minded a particular fiduciary may be, the only
certain way to insure full compliance with duty is to eliminate any possibility of personal gain.'
It was "understandable that, under the morals of the marketplace," Lazard should see no objection to receiving market value for the opportunity it was conferring. "But equity imposes a higher standard."'
Such decisions, standing alone, might suggest a rectitude not of
this world. The Judge's moral compass, however, has not always
pointed to liability. He vigorously dissented, for example, in Pearlstein
v. Scudder & German,'° a decision holding a brokerage firm liable in
damages to its client, an experienced investor, to whom, and at whose
urging, it had overextended credit in violation of statutory margin requirements. Friendly protested that the majority's conclusion "shocks
the conscience and wars with common sense""' and that "permitting
the customer to shift the risk of market decline to the broker"12 was
neither a necessary nor desirable means of furthering the primary purpose of the margin requirements-not to protect investors, but to regulate the flow of credit into the securities markets. "This case," he said,
"illustrates the need for putting some brakes on the'onrush of civil obligations for violation of the securities laws if that doctrine is to be an
instrument of justice rather than the opposite."' 3
445 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir. 1971).

8 Id. at 1342.
9 Id. at 1343.
10 429 F.2d 1136, 1145 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J., dissenting).
"I Id. at 1145.
12 Id. at 1147.

Is Id. at 1145-48. This decision proved stronger medicine than the industry was
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Pearlsteinwas not the first occasion on which Judge Friendly had
spoken of the need for caution in shaping private remedies under the
securities laws. The use and abuse of such remedies has long been a
dominant issue in the field. The securities statutes call for public enforcement by the SEC but, with few and narrow exceptions, do not
expressly provide for private civil liability. Since 1946, however, the
federal courts have consistently held a private right of action to be implicit in section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193414 and the
SEC's implementing regulation, Rule lOb-5 1 5-the key provisions relating to securities fraud-a conclusion confirmed by the Supreme
Court in 1971.16 Even earlier, in J.L Case Co. v. Borak,1" a proxy
solicitation case, the Court had authorized the federal courts "to be
alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the
congressional purpose." ' So instructed, the lower federal courts rushed
headlong to find implied civil liability whenever they believed that
would further the statutory purpose. In the mid-1970's, however, the
Supreme Court began to take a more guarded view of implied remedies1" and by the end of the decade, in decisions such as Touche Rosse
willing to take, and four years later it secured "clarifying" legislation permitting an
investment advisor to profit from the sale of its business on certain, not very onerous,
conditions. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(f) (1982); see also S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong. 1st
Sess. 71 (1975).
14 Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, codified at 15 U.S.C. §78j
(1982), provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or
any facility of any national securities exchange...
(b) to use or employ, in connection with the purchase of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, a manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange, (a). to employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary to order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or (c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
16 Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
17 377 U.S. 426 (1964), overruled, Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S.
560 (1979); see infra note 20 and accompanying text.
18 Borak, 377 U.S. at 433.
19 See, e.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975); see also infra note 20 and accompanying text.

14

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 133:1

& Co. v. Redington20 and TransamericaMortgage Advisors, Inc. v.
Lewis,"1 had adopted a fairly strong presumption against them, rebuttable only by affirmative evidence of congressional intent.
The shift in the Supreme Court's attitude from the green light of
Borak to the reddish light of Redington and Transamericafound little
reflection in Judge Friendly's opinions; these, throughout the entire period, flashed a cautious yellow light. Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache &
Co.22 posed the issue whether violation of a New York Stock Exchange

rule calling upon members to observe "just and equitable principles of
trade"-a provision required by statute to be included in the rules of
registered exchanges-was the basis for a judicially implied damage
remedy. Friendly concluded that the question of federal civil liability
for violation of exchange or dealer association rules
cannot be determined on the simplistic all-or-nothing basis
urged by the two parties; rather, the court must look to the
nature of the particular rule and its place in the regulatory
scheme, with the party urging the implication of a federal
liability carrying a considerably heavier burden of persuasion than when the violation is of the statute or an SEC
regulation.2"
A rule providing "what amounts to a substitute for regulation by the
SEC itself" or imposing "an explicit duty unknown to the common
law" would be a strong candidate for implication.24 The rule immediately at issue, however, was near the opposite pole, and the Judge
found "little reason to believe that by requiring exchanges and dealers'
associations to include such provisions in their rules Congress meant to
impose a new legal standard on members different from that long recognized by state law"2 5 or "contemplated judicial creation of a new
body of federal broker-customer law whenever the complaint in what
would otherwise be an action under state law alleged conduct inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade."2 "
Similar caution marked Friendly's influential concurring opinion
in Securities Exchange Commission v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,2 7 a

21

442 U.S. 560 (1979).
444 U.S. 11 (1979).

22

358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966).

20

22 Id.
24

at 182.

Id.

25 Id.

28

Id. at 183.

27

401 F.2d 833, 864 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., concurring), cert. denied, 394

U.S. 976 (1969).
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seminal public enforcement action under Rule 10b-5, in which one of
the found violations was the issuance by the corporation of a misleadingly pessimistic press release concerning its oil exploration activities.
The Judge suggested that while a corporation's negligent misstatement
in violation of Rule 10b-5 might warrant injunctive relief, liability for
damages in the absence of scienter would indirectly burden a major
segment of the class intended to be protected and work directly counter
to the interest of public disclosure of important business and financial
developments:
If the only choices open to a corporation are either to remain
silent and let false rumors do their work, or to make a communication, not legally required, at the risk that a slip of the
pen or failure properly to amass or weigh the facts-all
judged in the bright gleam of hindsight-will lead to large
judgments, payable in the last analysis by innocent investors,
for the benefit of speculators and their lawyers, most corporations would opt for the former.2"
If Judge Friendly's approach to private remedies was more cautious than that of most federal judges, and of the Supreme Court itself,
during the "ebullient stage" 29 that followed in the wake of Borak, the
opposite appears to be true in the recent period of Supreme Court retrenchment culminating in Redington and Transamerica.Leist v. Simplot30 and Goldberg v. Meridor 1 are the salient examples.
In Leist, Judge Friendly, writing for a divided panel, found an
implied private right of action in the Commodity Exchange Act, as
amended in 1974. The basis for this holding was that the lower federal
courts, prior to the 1974 amendments, had consistently recognized a
private remedy; that Congress was well aware of this state of the law
when it deliberated the amendments; and that its failure to eliminate
the private remedy implied a willingness and even a desire to retain
it. 2 The Supreme Court narrowly affirmed.' 3
28 Id. at 867. The opinion was written for the guidance of district judges in the
numerous private actions then pending against Texas Gulf. It may raise eyebrows that
Judge Friendly, a critic of the Supreme Court's "guideline opinions," should have been
guilty of this exercise in obiter. There seems, however, a world of difference between
the separate opinion of a single judge on an issue not presented and an authoritative
opinion of the Court itself prescribing an elaborately detailed set of rules to govern
future cases.
21 See L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1058 (1983).
30 638 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1980), affd sub nom. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
3 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
32 Standing alone, this reasoning might not have been compelling. The formidable

[Footnote 33 appears on page 16.]
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Goldberg v. Meridor3 4 was equally expansive and perhaps even
more controversial. The immediate background was the Supreme
35
Court's holding six months earlier in Santa Fe Industries v. Green
that "a breach of fiduciary duty by majority stockholders, without any
deception, misrepresentation, or nondisclosure" does not violate section
10(b) or Rule 10b-5."6 Hence minority shareholders of a Delaware corporation, complaining of the gross undervaluation of their shares in a
stock-for-stock exchange forced upon the corporation by its controlling
parent, had failed to state a cause of action under the statute or the
rule. The Court based this conclusion not only on the words of the
statute, but also on "additional considerations"-most notably, that
breach of corporate fiduciary duty was a cause of action traditionally
relegated to state law, much of which would be displaced by the adoption of federal fiduciary standards. The plaintiffs' alternative argument-that failure to give them advance notice of the merger was a
material nondisclosure under Rule 10b-5-was rejected, in a famous
footnote fourteen,"' on the narrower ground that since Delaware provided no injunctive remedy, and prior notice would therefore have done
the minority shareholders no good, its absence was not material.
In Goldberg, too, a minority stockholder alleged that the controlling parent had engineered a one-sided exchange-in this instance, an
exchange of the corporation's stock for the parent's overvalued assets-and had issued press releases that failed to disclose material facts
counterargument was that a few lower court cases, erroneously decided under current
Supreme Court doctrine, cannot become binding on the Supreme Court and the lower
federal courts merely because of the inaction of Congress in failing to override them;
that congressional inaction is equally consistent with an intent merely to leave the question of private remedies to the courts; that Redington and Transamerica created a
strong presumption against imolied rights of action that can be overcome only by powerful evidence of affirmative congressional intent; and that Judge Friendly's contrary
view creates the anomaly that statutes enacted prior to Borak in 1964 or subsequent to
Redington and Transamerica in 1979 afford no private rights of action while those
enacted during the intervening period do. In my view, what tips the scales in favor of
implication is that here the legislative history disclosed more than merely congressional
awareness and silence. Congress specifically focused on a problem it knew to be a consequence of the existence of private rights of action-namely, that the commodity exchanges, fearing civil damage liability for failure to enforce their own regulations, were
declining to adopt such regulations-and solved that problem not by abolishing the
private cause of action, as the exchanges urged, but instead by directing them to engage
in rule-making. Thus, whatever inference may appropriately be drawn from congressional silence per se, the circumstances in Leist warranted the conclusion that Congress
had made a deliberate choice.
31 Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
- 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977).
35 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
8 Id. at 476.
IId. at 474 n.14.
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about the transaction. No doubt to the surprise of many observers familiar with his respect for federalism, Judge Friendly, for a divided
panel, ruled that this latter nondisclosure allegation distinguished the
case from Santa Fe Industries and brought it within section 10(b);
here, moreover, the undisclosed facts were material because New York,
unlike Delaware, did afford minority shareholders an injunctive remedy. While conceding that a federal cause of action requires more than
mere "internal corporate mismanagement," the Judge insisted that
a parent's looting of a subsidiary with securities outstanding
in the hands of the public in a securities transaction is a
different matter; in such cases disclosure or at least the absence of misleading disclosure is required. It would be incongruous if Rule 10b-5 created liability for a casual "tip" in
the bar of a country club.

. .

but would not cover a parent's

undisclosed or misleadingly disclosed sale of its overvalued
assets for stock of a controlled subsidiary with securities in
the hands of the public. 8
Goldberg has been much followed 9 and much criticized.40 The
gist of the criticism is that since corporate power wielders rarely announce their breaches of fiduciary duty in advance, or at all, the practical effect of Goldberg's disclosure requirement is to sweep within section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 nearly all instances of corporate
mismanagement or fiduciary breach and thereby to "federalize the substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals with transactions
in securities" 4 -the very result that Santa Fe Industries sought to
avoid. This criticism does not persuade me. Had the transaction in
Goldberg required the unanimous approval of the shareholders, few
would have disputed the defendants' federal duty to disclose all facts
that might significantly influence the minority shareholders' decision;
the conclusion should be no different merely because the only self-protective measure open to the minority shareholders is a state-court injunction suit. More broadly, it is not clear why the issuance of stock
without accurate disclosure of the corporation's liabilities or business
risks should be more vulnerable to attack under section 10(b) than the
issuance of stock without disclosure of the directors' current practice
and continuing intent to loot the corporation, or why the officers of a
3 567 F.2d at 221.

See, e.g., Healey v. Catalyst Recovery, Inc., 616 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1980);
Kidwell ex rel. Penfold v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979).
40 See, e.g., R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 951-52 (5th
ed. 1982).
41 Santa Fe Industries, 430 U.S. at 479 (1977).
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corporation should be liable under section 10(b) when they misrepresent the value of the corporation's assets to the stockholders of a potential merger partner but not when they misrepresent the value of the
merger partner's assets to the minority stockholders of the corporation
itself.
The answer cannot simply be that breach of fiduciary duty is violative of state law and a federal remedy for its concealment therefore
unnecessary. That reasoning would strip Rule 10b-5, at least in private
damage actions, of virtually its entire coverage, since fraud, misrepresentation, and (in some jurisdictions) even misleading nondisclosure are
generally actionable at state law.4 2 Moreover, the Supreme Court's concern in Santa Fe Industries that a federal cause of action for breach of
fiduciary duty per se would require federal courts to fashion a nationally uniform law of fiduciary obligation, displacing established state
law,4 does not apply to a Goldberg-type cause of action for nondisclosure, a claim that does not depend on breach of fiduciary standards,
whether state or federal.""
" That § 10(b) is no mere residuary clause, applicable only to conduct not otherwise unlawful, was recently underscored in Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459
U.S. 375 (1983), in which the Supreme Court unanimously held that "the availability
of an express remedy under § 11 of the 1933 Act does not preclude defrauded purchasers of registered securities from maintaining an action under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act."
Id. at 387.
• See Santa Fe Industries, 430 U.S. at 479.
Other, more technical criticisms of Goldberg are equally wide of the mark. The
assertion of Professors Jennings and Marsh that circuit courts following Goldberg
"seized upon" footnote 14 of the Santa Fe Industries case and "treated it as though it
were the entire opinion," R. JENNINGS AND H. MARSH, supra note 40, at 951, clearly
does not apply to Goldberg itself. Judge Friendly claimed no affirmative support from
footnote 14, alluded to it only to distinguish it on the ground that New York, unlike
Delaware, did provide an injunctive remedy to minority shareholders in Goldberg's
position, and indeed put forward an alternative test of materiality that made footnote
14 and the existence of a state premerger remedy altogether irrelevant: namely, that a
deception practiced on the corporation by all its directors must be considered "material"
if the facts undisclosed or misleadingly disclosed to the shareholders would have assumed significance in the deliberations of a hypothetical reasonable and disinterested
director (clearly the case in Goldberg, where a disinterested director of the subsidiary, if
aware of the facts alleged in the complaint, might well have voted against the
transaction).
Professor Louis Loss, without disapproving of Goldberg in general, has observed
that it "does produce an anomaly with its rationale that a state law remedy for breach
of fiduciary duty, far from foreclosing a 10b-5 action, is precisely the foundation of a
theory of deception in that inadequate disclosure lulls stockholders into foregoing their
state law remedies." L. Loss, supra note 29, at 943.
The "anomaly," however, is more aptly attributed to Santa Fe Industries and its
footnote 14, which held the absence of a Delaware injunctive remedy to be a reason-the only stated reason-to reject the plaintiff's lack-of-prior-notice claim. Nor
would the "anomaly" disappear if Goldberg were reversed and a 10b-5 action made
dependent on the unavailability of a state remedy at the time of trial. A minority shareholder in Goldberg's position might get her foot in the federal door by showing that she
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No summary of the Judge's contributions to securities law would
be complete without some attention to his important decisions regarding
the transnational application of the Exchange Act. With increasing frequency, securities transactions have international dimensions. Negotiations in one country may lead to the sale in another of securities listed
in yet a third, issued by a corporation organized in a fourth, to purchasers scattered among these and other countries. A critical threshold
issue is whether the American ingredients of the transaction bring the
case within section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act (or any other
relevant substantive provision) and therefore within section 27 (vesting
district courts with subject matter jurisdiction over an action "to enforce
any liability or duty created by this chapter or the rules and regulations
thereunder").4 5 Neither the statute itself nor its legislative history offers
the slightest guidance, and the SEC has issued no pertinent regulations.
In a series of decisions in the early 1970's, Judge Friendly blazed a
trail through this largely uncharted terrain.
His starting point was the recognition that while international or
"foreign relations" law permits the United States to legislate with respect to acts either committed or producing effects within its territory,
"it would be . . . erroneous to assume that the legislature always
currently had no state remedy (for example, because the facts concealed from her did
not amount to a breach of fiduciary duty) but would still lose her case for want of
"materiality" if she could not establish that state injunctive relief would earlier have
been available but for the deception.
The only way to eliminate the anomaly would be to hold that the presence or
absence of a state pretransaction remedy is immaterial to "materiality"-either because
a deception does not become material merely by lulling stockholders into foregoing an
available remedy or, on the contrary, because it can be material even in the absence of
such a remedy. The former view would mean that a minority shareholder could be lied
to with federal impunity on the ground that the truth would have done her no good; the
latter, in effect Judge Friendly's alternative ground of "materiality" in Goldberg, seems
to offer the better escape.
In much the same vein as Professor Loss, Judge Aldisert, in a dissenting opinion,
has suggested that the Goldberg approach "provides federal relief to plaintiffs who have
state remedies, but denies federal relief to plaintiffs who have no state remedy." Healey
v.Catalyst Recovery, Inc., 616 F.2d 641, 648 (3d Cir. 1980). What Judge Aldisert
overlooks is that the focus of inquiry under footnote 14, and in Goldberg, is not
whether the plaintiff has a state law remedy at the time of bringing her 10b-5 action,
or indeed whether she ever had one at a time when she was in a position to take
advantage of it; rather, the state injunctive remedy whose presence or absence permits
or precludes a 10b-5 action is the remedy that hypothetically would (or would not)
have been available had plaintiff been aware of the facts that were concealed from her.
Lacking such a remedy, and therefore unable to act under 10b-5, a plaintiff may still
(as in Santa Fe Industries) have a state post hoc appraisal remedy. Conversely, a
plaintiff who would have had a state injunctive remedy may not be eligible for post hoc
relief (as, apparently, in Goldberg itself), in which case her federal cause of action is
not a second string in her bow, but the only string.
45 15 U.S.C. §78aa (1982).
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means to go to the full extent permitted." When "a court is confronted
with transactions that on any view are predominantly foreign, it must
seek to determine whether Congress would have wished the precious
resources of United States courts and law enforcement agencies to be
devoted to them rather than leave the problem to foreign countries."4 6
In Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell 47 an
American company seeking damages under section 10(b) alleged that its
purchase in Britain of the securities of a British corporation listed on
the London Stock Exchange had been induced in part by misrepresentations made by the British defendant in the United States. Judge
Friendly wondered whether "if Congress had thought about the point,
it would not have wished to protect an American investor if a foreigner
comes to the United States and fraudulently induces him to purchase
foreign securities abroad," and concluded that "[w]hile . . . impact on

an American company and its shareholders would [probably not] suffice
to make the statute applicable if the misconduct had occurred solely in
England,

. .

. it tips the scales in favor of applicability when substan-

tial misrepresentations were made in the United States."4 8
ITT v. Vencap, Ltd.49 established that a foreign purchaser, too,
could invoke section 10(b) when duped into buying foreign securities
abroad by misrepresentations made in America, since
[w]e do not think Congress intended to allow the United
States to be used as a base for manufacturing fraudulent security devices for export, even when these are peddled only
to foreigners. This country would surely look askance if one
of our neighbors stood by silently and permitted misrepresented securities to be poured into the United States. 50
This ruling, however, was "limited to the perpetration of fraudulent
acts themselves and does not extend to mere preparatory activities or
the failure to prevent fraudulent acts where the bulk of the activity was
performed in foreign countries."51 The distinction was admittedly "a
fine one," but
the line has to be drawn somewhere if the securities laws are
not to apply in every instance where something has happened in the United States, however large the gap between
4 Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d Cir. 1975).
47 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
48 Id. at 1337.
41 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
50 Id. at 1017.
51

Id. at 1018.
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the something and a consummated fraud and however negligible the effect in the United States or on its citizens.52
Thus, in Bersch v. Drexel Firestone,Inc., 3 a companion case considered by many the leading decision in the transnational field-a class
action involving a public offering outside the United States of stock in a
foreign corporation, based on an allegedly fraudulent prospectus produced and distributed abroad to purchasers of whom few were Americans-the claims of the foreign purchasers were held not to be governed
by section 10(b) merely because an American underwriter conducted
meetings in New York to plan and organize the offering.54 Those same
activities, however, were enough to trigger the application of section
10(b) when the injury was suffered by American purchasers residing
abroad.55 Meanwhile, the few American residents to whom false prospectuses were mailed from abroad could ground their claims on the
principle that a state may punish, in Justice Holmes's words, "acts
done outside [its] jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing
detrimental effects within it."'56 But that principle did not support subject matter jurisdiction over the claims of the foreign plaintiffs merely
because the fraud and subsequent collapse of the offered shares had
produced "an adverse effect on this country's general economic interests
' 57
or on American security prices. Moderation is all."
The last phrase captures the spirit of Judge Friendly's approach,
not only to transnational and other securities matters, but to judging in
general. There is no denying, however, that his opinions in these cases
represent "judicial legislation" in very nearly its purest form. The
Judge "freely acknowledge[d]" that
if we were [challenged] to point to language in the statutes,
or even in the legislative history, that compelled these conclusions, we would be unable to respond. The Congress that
passed these extraordinary pieces of legislation in the midst
of the depression could hardly have been expected to foresee
the development of offshore funds thirty years later.58
He conceded also that
reasonable men might conclude that the coverage was
52
53
54

55
56

57
58

Id.
519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975).

Id. at 987.
Id. at 992.
Id. at 988 (quoting Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 284-85 (1911)).
Id. at 989.
Id. at 993.
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greater, or less, than has been outlined in [the Bersch and
Vencap opinions.] Our conclusions rest on case law and commentary concerning the application of the securities laws and
other statutes to situations with foreign elements and on our
best judgment as to what Congress would have wished if
these problems had occurred to it.59
The judge was too modest: "case law" did not speak directly nor commentary authoritatively to the issues before the court in Bersch and
Vencap, and Congress left no clue as to what it "would have wished."
One can only assume, therefore, that the subtle pattern of inclusion and
exclusion sketched above reflected in large part what the judges "would
have wished" had they been members of Congress-reinforced, no
doubt, by the recognition that Congress itself, when confronting controversial issues of public policy, in which the contending political forces
are of equal or indeterminate strength, usually eschews the extremes
and hews to a middle course. The dilemma that might arise when a
judge's sense of the desirable is at odds with his sense of the politically
possible was not presented to Judge Friendly in the transnational cases,
and rarely would be to one of his instinctive moderation.
Friendly could not have been comfortable in attributing his policy
preferences to a Congress that had neither expressed nor implied its
own. The predicament of the judge forced to read a statute in the dark
had troubled him from the very beginning of his tenure. An essay written two years after he came to the bench endorsed Learned Hand's
view that a judge who has exhausted inconclusively all other processes
of statutory interpretation, and is forced at last to consider the relative
desirability of the alternative results, must even then "always remember
that he should go no further than he is sure the government would have
gone, had it been faced with the case before him" and if in doubt "must
stop, for he cannot tell that the conflicting interests in the society for
which he speaks would have come to a just result, even though he is
sure that he knows what the just result should be."" Friendly added
that the judge "must endeavor to puzzle out what the legislature would
have deemed desirable, not what he would have thought. Attempt this
he must; yet we cannot reasonably expect that fallible human beings
will always be capable of selflessness so sublime.""1
In the transnational securities cases, even the sublimely selfless
59 Id.

60 H. FRIENDLY, Reactions of a Lawyer-Newly-Become-Judge, in BENCHMARKS,
supra note 2, at 18 (quoting L. HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 109 (1952)).
61 Id.
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judge might find it difficult to avoid reading her thoughts into the legislative mind, for the Hand prescription-"When in doubt,
stop!"-arguably does not yield a determinate answer as to which of
several reasonable limits should be placed on the extraterritorial application of section 10(b). It could mean that section 10(b) stops at the
water's edge since a court cannot be sure Congress would have wished
to go further; or, no less plausibly, that section 10(b) goes to the limits
permitted by foreign relations law, since a court cannot be sure Congress would have wished to stop short of that natural point. Whether it
is controversial extensions or controversial exceptions that are to be
avoided depends on one's initial baseline, and this in turn may not be
determinable without resort to one or another of the familiar but often
conflicting canons of construction-"Read criminal statutes narrowly!"
or "Read remedial statutes broadly!" It is to Judge Friendly's credit
that he did not seek refuge in such spurious objectivity.
II.

JUDGE FRIENDLY AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

In the field of criminal procedure, Judge Friendly's most riotable
contributions have come from the lectern rather than the bench. In a
series of lectures at the University of Cincinnati in 1968, entitled "The
Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change," 62
he delivered one of the most powerful critiques ever made of the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. Reexamining the policies
traditionally thought to justify the privilege and finding none of them
adequate to support some of the Court's modern extensions, he proposed amending the amendment so as to limit its application or prevent
its further extension to areas such as noncustodial questioning, compulsory production of goods and documents, and judicial comment on refusal to testify.
Two years later, in the 1970 Ernst Freund Lectures at the University of Chicago Law School, he offered an equally challenging reappraisal of modern developments relating to collateral attack on criminal
judgments and advanced the thesis that, with a few important exceptions, "convictions should be subject to collateral attack only when the
prisoner supplements his constitutional plea with a colorable claim of
innocence." 6 3 Significantly, both of these fundamental, and in some
ways even radical, critiques were accompanied by a detailed formula12 Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional
Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 671 (1968).
" Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on CriminalJudgments,

38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 142 (1970).
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tion of what Judge Friendly would have substituted. This sense of responsibility to produce a better mousetrap, rather than negative criticism alone, is a hallmark of Friendly's nonjudicial writings and an
expression of his essential pragmatism. In an age when critics, particularly radical critics, of existing legal doctrine and institutions frequently
disclaim any obligation to provide constructive alternatives, the specificity of Judge Friendly's prescriptions is a breath of fresh air.
An earlier and more general statement of Friendly's philosophy of
criminal procedure was the 1965 Morrison Lecture to the State Bar of
California.6 4 There he urged that

in applying the Bill of Rights to the states, the Supreme
Court should not regard these declarations of fundamental
principles as if they were a detailed code of criminal procedure, allowing no room whatever for reasonable difference of
judgment or play in the joints. The "specifics" simply are
not that specific. 5
Noting the current "great debate" on criminal procedure in legal and
law enforcement circles, and the codification projects of the American
Bar Association and American Law Institute, he expressed the fear that
these efforts might
die aborning, if, instead of questions subject to fair debate
being decided by Congress and the state legislatures, the
most significant issues should already have been settled for
all time by the casting vote of one or two respected men in a
stately building in Washington, without the fact-finding resources of the legislature-very likely in "hard cases" where
the full consequences of decision may have been clouded by
understandable outrage over the facts at hand."
Applying these generalizations, he took issue with the proposition-thought to have been established, or at least foreshadowed, by the
recent decision in Escobedo v. Illinois67-that the sixth amendment's
assistance of counsel guarantee is available to the suspect the moment
she is arrested or brought to the station house. The amendment, he
said, does not so provide in terms and "in sharp contrast to the assistance of counsel at trial or plea, the problem is too complex for sound
" H. FRIENDLY, The Bill of
BENCHMARKS, supra note 2, at 235,
65

88

Id. at 262-63.
Id. at 235-36.

67 378 U.S. 478 (1964).

Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, in
262-264.
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solution by a constitutional absolute" 6 -especially where questioning
may be necessary to retrieve stolen property, recover a kidnap victim, or
apprehend now alerted confederates. 9
A subsequent Postscript70 to the lecture took account of the Supreme Court's intervening decision, in Miranda v. Arizona,7 that incustody interrogation without suitable warnings violates, not the sixth
amendment's right to counsel, as Escobedo had seemed to say, but the
fifth amendment's privilege against compelled self-incrimination. Miranda precisely exemplified the constitutional absolutism against which
the lecture had counseled. It was predicated, Friendly argued, on the
empirically unfounded generalization that all in-custody interrogation
is inherently coercive, a proposition refuted by "countless instances" in
which answers to custodial questioning are given without the slightest
pressure. "To say that such answers are 'compSlied' is to indulge in
Humpty Dumpty's free-wheeling use of words. . . . The Court disserves its great role as vindicator of the Bill of Rights when it constructs from plainly inadequate data a generalization refuted by the
common experience of mankind." 2 The Miranda majority had also
departed from logic "by inflexible across the board requirements with
respect to waiver."' 73 Granting that knowledge is indispensable to
waiver, Friendly failed to see
just what in the Constitution authorized the Court to say to
the fifty states that although the defendant in fact was fully
aware of his rights and knowingly and intelligently forwent
them, his action must be held for naught unless the police
followed a particular Court-prescribed ritual, which apparently must be repeated whenever questioning is
recommenced. 4
Both in the lecture and in the Postscript Judge Friendly challenged the uncompromising rigidity of the exclusionary rule (whether
under the fourth, fifth, or sixth amendments), the assumption the "the
Constitution demands that convictions be automatically set aside in
every instance in which material evidence obtained in violation of some
" H. FRIENDLY, supra note 64, at 250.
Id. at 257.
70 H. FRIENDLY, A Postscript on Miranda, in
69

266.
7
7*
73
74

384 U.S. 436 (1966).
H. FRIENDLY, supra note 70, at 273.
Id. at 273-74.
Id. at 274.

BENCHMARKS,

supra note 2, at
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'specific' of the Bill of Rights was received."'75 He argued that "[t]he
beneficent aim of the exclusionary rule to deter police misconduct can
be sufficiently accomplished by . . . outlawing evidence obtained by
flagrant or deliberate violation of rights" ' and in any event should not
77
automatically be extended to the "fruits" of such evidence.
While Judge Friendly's case for judicial restraint in matters of
criminal procedure contains elements of pragmatism, federalism, and
democratic theory, the latter two themes are distinctly subordinate to
the first. Friendly's federalism is not, primarily, the philosopher's devotion to decentralized government or the historian's reverence for the
role the states have played in our political system-though the Judge
would not, perhaps, disavow either characterization; above all, it is the
pragmatist's faith in the efficacy of experimentation. Justice Brandeis's
belief that it is "one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a
single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory" 7 8 -1ives on in his former law clerk. No doubt this has much to do
with Friendly's opposition to the Supreme Court's selective incorporation doctrine under which "once a particular provision of the Bill of
Rights makes the grade for absorption [into the fourteenth amendment],
it comes over to the states with all the overlays the Court has developed
and may develop in applying it to the federal government. 7' 9 A procedural requirement applicable exclusively to the Congress shuts off only
one of the nation's fifty-one sources of legislative experimentation; applicable to the states as well, it forecloses all fifty-one.
As for democratic theory, Friendly makes surprisingly little of the
nonelected character of the judiciary in assessing its institutional competence. At times he seems to favor legislative action not so much because of its greater responsiveness to the vox populi as because of its
potential receptiveness to proposals from the American Law Institute.
At other times he appears to associate "the democratic tradition" itself
with the capacity for self-correction through trial and error.
Given Judge Friendly's penchant for balancing, it is not surprising
that he should prefer the due process clause to the delusive "specifics"
of the Bill of Rights as the chosen instrument for adjusting the competing social and individual interests in the criminal justice system.80 In
particular it is due process by which he would measure the acceptabilH. FRIENDLY, supra note 64, at 260.
Id. at 262.
H. FRIENDLY, supra note 70, at 279-80.
¢ New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (dissenting opinion).
¢ H. FRIENDLY, supra note 64, at 242.
80 See id. at 262-65.
75

71
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ity of the means used to obtain information from a suspect in custody.
Where the judicial scales tip in favor of the suspect-especially if the
reliability of the evidence is in doubt-there is reason to think Friendly
would be quite unstinting in his protectiveness, even though reasonable
others, including reasonable state legislators, might differ.
A striking illustration of this is the Judge's approach to the problem of the exclusionary rule with respect to evidence obtained through
the out-of-court identification of a suspect by an eyewitness. In Stovall
v. Denno, 1 the Supreme Court held that an eyewitness identification,
obtained through a confrontation procedure "unnecessarily suggestive
and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification," is inadmissible
under the due process clause.8 2 Later language in Neil v. Biggers,"3
however, strongly implied that such an identification might after all be
admissible if in the "totality of the circumstances" it appeared to be
reliable.8 4 In Braithwaite v. Manson,8 5 Judge Friendly rejected this interpretation of Biggers; he held that its flexible approach applied only
to pre-Stovall identifications; that post-Stovall identifications unnecessarily obtained through impermissibly suggestive procedures must be
excluded without regard to their probable accuracy in the particular
case; and that no rule less stringent "can force police administrators
and prosecutors to adopt procedures that will give fair assurance
against the awful risks of misidentification."8 8 The Supreme Court in
turn reversed this decision, holding that reliability in all the circumstances is the "linchpin" in determining admissibility both for pre- and
87
post-Stovall confrontations.
At first blush, this seems a remarkable reversal of roles: Judge
Friendly, the arch-critic of per se exclusionary rules, practicing what he
had long preached against, only to be corrected by a Supreme Courts
newly wary of procedural absolutism. The Judge's reliance on the deterrence rationale is the more incongruous in that here, unlike in the
fourth amendment area, the police-conducted confrontation of witness
and suspect is not itself unconstitutional; due process is violated only by
the later introduction of the evidence.8 8
81 388 U.S. 293 (1967).

Id. at 302.
83 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
84 Id. at 198-99.
85 527 F.2d 363 (2d Cir. 1975), rev'd, 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
" 527 F.2d at 371.
87 Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977).
" An unreasonable search or seizure, of course, is a completed violation of the
fourth amendment whether or not the evidence is later introduced at trial. It is unclear
whether station house questioning without a Miranda waiver is similarly a completed
violation of the fifth amendment. See H. FRIENDLY, supra note 70, at 279-80. Post82
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On further reflection, however, Friendly's decision becomes less
mysterious. For one thing, the misleadingly described "per se" exclusionary rule came into play only after a prior determination that the
confrontation procedure was both unduly and unnecessarily suggestive.
Had the exclusionary rule in the custodial interrogation context been
similarly conditioned, the Judge would have found it far more palatable, for he has never taken the position that inculpatory statements
obtained by truly coercive means should be admissible in evidence
merely because the statements themselves are circumstantially corroborated or otherwise reliable. More important, the balance of social benefits and costs was far more favorable to exclusion in the identification
than in the interrogation context. On the benefit side, there are far
stronger empirical grounds for distrusting eyewitness identifications
than for doubting the self-incriminating statements of suspects under
normal police questioning even in the station house setting. As the Supreme Court has observed, the "vagaries of eyewitness identification
are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of
mistaken identification.""9 Indeed, in the view of one commentator,
"The influence of improper suggestion upon identifying witnesses
probably accounts for more miscarriages of justice than any other single
factor," more perhaps "than all other factors combined."9' Thus Judge
Friendly's sensitivity to the "awful risks of misidentification" was entirely in keeping with his larger conviction that the accurate determination of guilt or innocence is the foremost objective of criminal procedure. Given the ready availability of more neutral confrontation
procedures, and the ease with which a flexible exclusionary rule can be
watered down in practice, nothing less than a per se rule might have
been thought adequately protective. On the cost side of the equation,
compliance with the Miranda rules, by encouraging suspects to clam
up, often deprives the authorities of reliable evidence vital not only to
the conviction of a guilty suspect but also to other law enforcement
objectives-the apprehension of confederates, the prevention of ongoing
or future crime, and the recovery of stolen goods or kidnapped persons.
Such consequences would rarely flow from the use of a proper identification procedure, especially when exception is made, as in Stovall, for
emergency situations. Here, moreover, in contrast to the Miranda situarraignment questioning in the absence of counsel is dearly not a completed violation of
the sixth amendment if the information gathered is not subsequently used against the
arraigned defendant at trial. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206-07

(1964).
89
90

United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967).
P. WALL, EYE-WrrNEss IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CAsEs 26 (1965),

quoted in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 229 (1967).
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ation, the constable's blunder will seldom set the criminal free; the
tainted identification can be replaced by a later one, usually in court,
provided only that the latter is known, in all the circumstances, to be
reliable.
Another example of Judge Friendly's due process analysis, albeit
in a somewhat different context, is worth some discussion, not only because the decision has been widely followed, but also because it contrasts with the Supreme Court's approach to the same general problem.
Johnson v. Glick9 was a section 1983 action by a prisoner against a
guard who allegedly attacked him without provocation and detained
him for lengthy periods in a holding cell.9 2 Friendly, writing for the
panel, held that although the complaint did not state a claim of cruel
and unusual punishment under the eighth amendment, "quite apart
from any 'specific' of the Bill of Rights, application of undue force by
law enforcement officers deprives a suspect of liberty without due process of law," and the same principle extends "to acts of brutality by
correctional officers, although the notion of what constitutes brutality
may not necessarily be the same." 3 The opinion is notable for its formulation of the standard to be used in distinguishing "constitutional
batteries" from the common law variety.
The management by a few guards of large numbers of prisoners, not usually the most gentle or tractable of men and
women, may require and justify the occasional use of a degree of intentional force. Not every push or shove, even if it
may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers, violates a prisoner's constitutional rights. In determining whether the constitutional line has been crossed, a court
must look to such factors as the need for the application of
force, the relationship between the need and the amount of
force that was used, the extent of injury inflicted, and
whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain
or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the
very purpose of causing harm.9
Despite some unresolved difficulties, 95 the approach adopted in
91 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973).
92 Id. at 1029-30.
93 Id. at 1032, 1033.
94

Id. at 1033.

95 The Johnson opinion does not adequately explain why the standard for "consti-

tutional battery" must be higher than for its state law counterpart. It is not enough to
say that prison guards in disciplinary situations may need greater latitude in the use of
force than ordinary people in ordinary situations; this may be the basis for a defense of
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Johnson seems less problematic than the Supreme Court's quite different approach to the problem of "constitutional torts" under the due
process clause. In Ingraham v. Wright,9" the Court held that corporal
punishment in public schools "implicates a constitutionally protected
liberty interest.1'9 7 But rather than measuring the teacher's conduct by

a constitutional yardstick of the sort fashioned by Judge Friendly for
the prison guard, the Court concluded instead that in view of the existence of a "common-law privilege permitting teachers to inflict reasonable corporal punishment" and the "availability of [state judicial] remedies for abuse," due process was satisfied and a federal remedy
therefore unavailable.98 In a similar vein, it held in Parrattv. Taylor9"
that the loss of a prisoner's hobby kit through the negligence of the
warden was not actionable under the fourteenth amendment-not as
Justice Powell, and doubtless Judge Friendly, would have had it, because the triviality of the misconduct and the injury did not rise to the
level of an unconstitutional "deprivation" but because, given the availability of state judicial remedies, the deprivation was not "without due
process."1 0 0
This approach, carried to the limits of its logic, makes the fourteenth amendment both overinclusive and underinclusive: overinclusive
when applied to situations in which there has clearly been a "deprivation of liberty" in the dictionary sense but no state remedy is available
(for example, the personal injury inflicted on a jaywalking pedestrian
by a nonnegligently driven police car in the midst of a chase); underinclusive in the converse situation, involving truly egregious misconduct
(for example, the brutal behavior of the police in Monroe v. Pape)0 1
fully actionable in the state courts.
No one imagines, of course, that the Court will press the Ingraham-Parrattlogic to the limit. In the case of overinclusiveness, it will
privilege under state law as well. Perhaps all Judge Friendly meant was that there
must be a nationally uniform federal standard under the due process clause rather than
state-to-state variation. But the Judge's repeated references to Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165 (1952), and its famous "conduct that shocks the conscience" test suggest that
no ordinary excess will suffice. See Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d at 1033. This conclusion, however, is clearly not compelled by the language of the due process clause, and
Judge Friendly does not spell out the policy considerations (fear of trivializing the Constitution, preservation of federal judicial resources, reluctance to displace state authority) upon which he means it to rest.
96 430 U.S. 651.
97 Id. at 672.
98 Id. at 674, 683.
99 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
100 Id. at 537, 543-44.
101 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part, Monnell v. Department of Social
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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cabin the constitutional remedy either by discarding the simplistic dictionary approach to "deprivation" in favor of a more refined delineation of the wrong or by further extending the catalogue of judicially
implied privileges under section 1983. In the "underinclusiveness" situation the Court has already previewed its escape routes. In Parrattit
distinguished Monroe on the ground that the violation there was of the
fourth amendment, not the fourteenth alone, and thus did not hinge on
the presence or absence of "due process." This distinction, however, is
painfully artificial-not only because the fourth amendment binds the
states only through the due process clause of the fourteenth-but because of its utterly irrational consequences. A police officer who beats
up a citizen while searching her home (in violation of the fourth
amendment) or while questioning her at the station house (in violation
of her privilege against self-incrimination) or anywhere because of her
race (in violation of the equal protection clause) would be liable in federal court under section 1983, whereas an officer who beats up a citizen
on a street corner out of sheer dislike would not be.
A more promising basis for distinguishing Parrattfrom cases such
as Monroe and Johnson is that the latter involved deprivations of liberty
rather than, like Parratt,a deprivation of property. The liberty-property distinction makes some sense if the due process issue hinges solely
on the adequacy of the state postdeprivation process as a substitute for
a prior hearing that could have prevented the deprivation altogether. A
damage recovery will more often more closely approach full restoration,
rendering a prior hearing correspondingly less essential, in property
cases than in liberty cases. Property loss, however, is not always fully
reparable, nor is liberty loss always irreparable. More important, it can
fairly be argued that in cases such as those we are discussing-where a
predeprivation hearing is obviously unfeasible-that the proper comparison for due process purposes is between state and federal
postdeprivation remedies, and that where the former is substantially as
effective as the latter-and substantially as effective as possible-due
process is satisfied. To be sure, the state remedy, though available and
fully compensatory in theory, may not be sufficiently reliable in practice to be considered an acceptable substitute for postdeprivation scrutiny by a federal court. In holding that a citizen need not exhaust state
judicial or administrative processes before bringing a federal court action under section 1983, the Supreme Court has repeatedly noted the
deep distrust with which those state processes were viewed by the Congress that enacted that statute in 1871. The Congress that proposed the
fourteenth amendment five years earlier undoubtedly shared that mistrust. Thus, whether the stake be liberty or property, to hold that the
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existence on paper of a state tort remedy satisfies the due process requirement and insulates otherwise unconstitutional state action from
scrutiny or redress by a federal court goes against the historic spirit of
the amendment.
The two classes of deprivation might also be distinguished, of
course, on the ground that property is a lesser interest more cheerfully
exposed to the risk of state-court bias. That limitation, however, was
rejected by the Supreme Court in Lynch v. Household Finance
Corp.,10 2 in which Justice Stewart wrote that "the dichotomy between
personal liberties and property rights is a false one,"10 3 and that the
federal courts have been -"particularly bedeviled by 'mixed' cases in
which both personal and property rights are implicated, and the line
between them has been difficult to draw with any consistency or principled objectivity. '"- Confining Parrattto deprivation of property cases
would give rise to similar difficulties and anomalies. A citizen driver
involved in a collision with a negligently driven police car would have a
federal constitutional claim for personal injury but only a state law
claim for her property damages. At all events, whatever the ultimate
limiting principle, one can be fairly sure that cases involving physical
abuse of suspects, prisoners, or other citizens will be governed in the
end not by Parratt,but by a balancing text such as Judge Friendly's in
Johnson v. Glick.
CONCLUSION

For twenty-five years Henry Friendly has occupied a preeminent
position in American law. In nearly a thousand judicial opinions, and
in other writings covering the legal landscape, he has uniquely combined the roles of judge and scholar. His opinions in the field of securities regulation-briefly and inadequately sampled above-are merely
illustrative of the qualities that distinguish all his work: consummate
craftsmanship; a principled common sense that pays attention to the
practical consequences of decisions and to the efficient use of scarce
judicial resources; avoidance of all-or-nothing approaches in favor of
balancing, weighing, and the drawing of fine lines to reflect real but
subtle differences; deference, where appropriate, to other decisionmakers, along with willingness, where necessary, to make hard
moral choices; and obediance to higher judicial authority, without fear,
from time to time, of testing its limits. In the tradition of Learned
102

405 U.S. 538 (1972).

103

Id. at 552.

'o0 Id. at 551 (footnote omitted).
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Hand, Judge Friendly has given absolutes no quarter. "Moderation is
all."

